The Three Correlates

Between the years 1902 and 1903, as Peirce delved into phenomenology, he realized that a complete description of a sign should consider not only the representational and communicative aspects of the sign but also the aspect of the sign’s manifestation or material presence.

This led to the development of the Three Correlates of the sign, from which Peirce derived the tenfold semiotic triangle (see Appendix A). These three correlates can be thought of as three different perspectives on the sign. The three correlates examine the sign through its: (1) presentational, (2) representational, or (3) communicative aspects. In other words, we ask three questions:

  1. How does the sign present and manifest itself?
  2. How does the sign represent its object?
  3. What kind of effect does the sign produce, i.e., what does it communicate?

We’ll turn to inquire these correlates now in more detail.

1st Correlate (S)

describes the presentational essence of the sign. It focuses on how the sign manifests, without considering the sign’s relationship to the object it claims to represent or its relationship to the interpretation, i.e., the effect of the sign. This concerns the sign in itself (M). A sign in itself can be (1) a possible quality, i.e., a qualisign (like color in itself, independent of its manifestation), (2) an individual manifestation, i.e., a sinsign (like a single loud noise), or (3) a law, rule, or habit that governs manifestations, i.e., a legisign (such as a traffic rule or a law of nature).

2nd Correlate (S–O)

describes the representational nature of the sign, i.e., how the sign refers to the object it represents, without considering the effect the sign produces in interpretation. This concerns the relationship between the sign and the object (M–O). The sign’s relationship to the object can be based on (1) similarity, in which case it is an icon (a portrait is a similar depiction of the person it portrays), (2) an actual relationship, in which case it is an index (a thermometer has an actual relationship to the ambient temperature), or (3) a conventional association between the sign and the object, in which case it is a symbol (a red traffic light is associated with stopping through a learned convention).

3rd Correlate (S–O–I)

describes the interpretative or communicative nature of the sign, i.e., the effect the sign produces in the interpreting mind. This concerns the relationship between the sign, the object, and the interpretation (M–O–I). The communicative effect produced by the sign can be (1) a general possibility of interpretation, i.e., a rheme, (2) an individual communicated fact, i.e., a dicisign, or (3) a general communicated law-like conclusion, i.e., an argument.

The 9 Types of Signs

First Correlate

1stness in the 1C

Qualisign is pure quality—pure firstness. It represents a possibility that must become concrete in order to be felt and observed (EP2: 291, 1903). However, quality is different from the stimulus in which it appears. For example, we can consider the qualities of music apart from the physical stimuli of sound waves.
When both the phase of establishment (sign) and the phase of manifestation (object + interpretation) are governed solely by possibility, we have a quality sign. Nothing has yet become concrete. Both the sign, its object, and its interpretation are still pure possibilities—pure potential.
Example: The color itself in a color catalog or in artificial hair used to describe hair colors. The possibility of possibility. Quality itself before it materializes.

2ndness in the 1C

Sinsign is a powerful individual existing thing “here and now” (EP: 291, 1903). A sinsign has the power to penetrate our consciousness, regardless of our opinions (CP 1.21). It is a powerful reaction between two individuals—a dyadic relationship, that is, pure secondness (CP 1.456).
When the actualization governs both the phase of establishment (sign) and the phase of manifestation (object + interpretation), we have a sinsign. Now both the sign and its object truly exist, causing an actual interpretation. For example, a loud sound (sign) from something that exists (object) causing a reflex (interpretation) is a sinsign.
Example: A single sharp sound, smell, or taste. A single lightning strike or gust of wind.

3rdness in the 1C

Legisign is a sign that is a law, rule, or habit (EP2: 291, 1903). A legisign directs and regulates the manifestation of its individual instances (Romanini, 2006, 94). It materializes only in instances, as its essence lies in its tendency for the future (would-be). This means that the legisign itself does not exist. The legisign itself cannot be sensed or pointed out directly. Only its manifestations (instances) can be observed and pointed out. The essence of a legisign is thus a general power and tendency to which its manifestations conform. It is pure thirdness.
When a habit governs both the phase of establishment (sign) and the phase of manifestation (object + interpretation), we have a legisign. The sign, its object, and its interpretation are all general. A legisign does not refer to any particular object but rather to a type of object, causing a certain type of interpretation.
Example: The force of a traffic rule causes certain types of interpretations. The force of a soccer rule leads to the understanding of a yellow card in all future soccer games. The tendency of trees to shed their leaves in autumn.

Second Correlate

1stness in the 2C

Icon means that the relationship between the sign and the object is based on similarity (EP2: 460, 1909). In other words, the sign embodies the qualities of its object. For example, a photograph or portrait refers to its object because it resembles the object. In fact, a pure icon does not distinguish between the object and the sign; rather, they merge into one another (CP 5.47). However, a pure icon does not exist as such, because existence requires otherness. The icon is an important transmitter of form, as it embodies the form itself (Romanini, 2006, 94).
Example: A drawing of a dog is an icon of a dog because it embodies similar qualities (colors, shapes). The contour lines on a map are similar to the actual terrain. A plastic skeleton in a biology class is an icon of a real skeleton.

2ndness in the 2C

Index means that the relationship between the sign and the object is based on a real connection (EP2: 5, 1894). In other words, the sign is in an actual material or causal connection with its object. For example, a thermometer is an index of temperature because the height of the mercury has a real connection to the surrounding temperature. A pure index blindly points to its object without conveying any information about it (Romanini, 2006, 95). For instance, if you point your finger at an object, the pointing itself does not convey information about the object but merely indicates a particular object. Pointing with a finger is thus close to a pure index.
Example: Smoke is an index of fire because “there is no smoke without fire.” A weather vane is an index of wind. A car’s speedometer is an index of speed.

3rdness in the 2C

Symbol means that the relationship between the sign and the object is based on a convention that connects the sign and the object (EP2: 460-461, 1909). The sign can be connected to the object through a learned (ontogenetic) or innate (phylogenetic) convention (EP2: 9, 1894). For example, the connection between the words of our language and the objects they represent is not based on similarity or a real connection, but on a learned convention that associates the word with its object. We understand, for example, that the word “dog” refers to a specific four-legged and furry creature. On the other hand, bees have an innate convention that connects a bee’s dance with nearby flowers.
Example: Words in a language, terms in logic, national flags, or military insignia. Female peacocks interpret the tail of a male peacock as a symbol of the male’s reproductive fitness. According to Peirce, the universe is also a symbol (EP2: 193, 1903).

Third Correlate

1stness in the 3C

Rheme is the possibility of interpretation (Romanini, 2006, 101). A rheme has a tendency to produce an interpretation related to the qualitative properties of the sign (Liszka, 1996, 40). Examples of rhemes include individual words (terms) in a language. For instance, the word “dog” brings to mind various qualities and characteristics related to dogs, but it does not refer to any specific individual. In this sense, a rheme is inherently vague and unclear (CP 4.539). Due to its indeterminacy, a rheme does not actually assert anything, and thus does not produce information (Liszka, 1996, 41). In fact, a rheme cannot even be said to be true or false (Romanini, 2006, 101). A rheme conveys qualities and properties about an object, but because it does not properly indicate the object, the object itself remains unclear and is more of a possibility than anything actual (Liszka, 1996, 41).

2ndness in the 3C

Dicent (or Proposition) asserts or claims something about the world (Romanini, 2006, 102). A dicent guides the interpretation to connect the meaning with a specific object, thereby producing information (Liszka, 1996, 41). In other words, a dicent contains the property or meaning of an object (a rheme), but it also indicates a specific object (Liszka, 1996, 41). For example, the statement “Musti is a dog” connects the rheme (the idea of a dog) with a specific object (Musti). The object of the dicent is therefore determined, unlike in a rheme, which is why a dicent can be either true or false. Musti is either a dog or not.

3rdness in the 3C

Argument directs the interpretation to connect signs with each other in a lawful and systematic manner (Liszka, 1996, 42). The interpretation of an argument is therefore similar to a chain of reasoning. While a dicent connects rhemes into a higher-level interpretation, an argument connects dicents into a higher-level interpretation (Liszka, 1996, 42). An example of an argument is the following reasoning: “All dogs are mammals, and Musti is a dog, so Musti is a mammal.” Notice how the argument connects individual dicents in a way that creates additional information. An argument can thus be understood as both a conclusion and a principle that guides the reasoning process, leading the interpretation towards habituality and regularity (Liszka, 1996, 42–43).

Deriving the 10 Signs

When we combine the three correlates with the categories, we create a table with nine cells, as each correlate can represent either Firstness, Secondness, or Thirdness.

In the first correlate’s column, according to the three categories, there are three different types of signs in themselves (M). In the second correlate’s column, there are three different types of relationships between the sign and the object (M–O). In the third column, there are three different communicative effects produced by the sign (M–O–I).

The primary concern now is not understanding what a qualisign, an index, or a dicent sign means, but rather how the correlates are “filled” with the three categories. The correlates represent three different perspectives or aspects through which we can examine a sign. Next, we will examine the logical relationship between the correlates, which allows us to connect them with each other. The logical relationships between the correlates correspond to the relationships between the three categories. In other words, the 1st correlate determines the 2nd correlate, which in turn determines the 3rd correlate. Thus, the 1st correlate is logically primary to the 2nd correlate, which is logically primary to the 3rd correlate. This is easy to see. The 3rd correlate describes the relationship between the sign, the object, and the interpretation (M–O–I), which includes and is determined by the relationship between the sign and the object (M–O). In turn, the 2nd correlate includes and is determined by the sign in itself (M). This follows the same logic that we already encountered with the three categories (see section 3.1.3).

However, we now encounter something new. Namely, each correlate can represent Firstness, Secondness, or Thirdness, which slightly complicates their relationships. We are introduced to a new logical rule, according to which the preceding correlate cannot have a lower categorical value than the subsequent correlate. We can express this mathematically:

\[ 1\text{. correlate} \geq 2\text{. correlate} \geq 3\text{. correlate} \]

So we now have two rules:

  • the 1st correlate determines the 2nd correlate, which determines the 3rd correlate, and
  • a “smaller” correlate cannot have a lower categorical value than the following correlate

Using these two rules, we can derive the ten signs, each with its own three-digit code.

i ii iii iv v vi vii viii ix x
1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 3
1 1 2 2 1 2 2 3 3 3
1 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3

Let’s consider a few examples. For instance, the sign 121 is impossible because how could the relationship between the sign and the object be real (S–O=2) if the sign itself is not yet materialized but is still a pure possibility (S=1)? Similarly, the sign 212 is impossible because how could the sign communicate a fact (S–O–I=2) about the object if the sign is not in a real connection with its object (S–O=1)?

The Diagram of 10 Signs

How to read the Diagram?

Relation in the diagram.

Abstraction–Instantiation

Practical Examples

Grounding Habit

A sign can never fully represent its object; rather, it selects a certain feature (form) that allows for partial representation of the object (Romanini, 2006, 87). For example, a painting selects qualitative features (colors) of the object, while a footprint selects existential features (the actual shape of the foot).
This collection of selected features is called the foundation (EP1: 4, 1868). Semiologically, this refers to a manner (thirdness) on the phase of establishment, which simultaneously represents a transition from the phenomenological stage to the subjective stage. In any case, thirdness on the phase of establishment is a foundation or form. This foundation enables the comparison of mental content (predicate) with a specific stimulus (subject). Through comparison, the predicate connects with the subject, form connects with matter, producing information. The foundation itself (holonym) can be understood as a pure “Platonic” idea:

‘Idea’ is here to be understood in a sort of Platonic sense, very familiar in everyday talk; I mean in that sense in which we say that one man catches another man’s idea, in which we say that when a man recalls what he was thinking of at some previous time, he recalls the same idea, and in which when a man continues to think anything, say for a tenth of a second, in so far as the thought continues to agree with itself during that time, that is to have a like content, it is the same idea, and is not at each instant of the interval a new idea. (CP 2.228, 1897, original italics.)

Thus, a holonym involves a certain mental continuity, which aligns with its nature as the firstness of thirdness (1”), a metaphysical category meaning precisely mental continuity. Notice how in the holonym, the object (K) and the interpretation (T) were still at the level of pure possibility (manifestation phase=1). This means that the thought or idea is not yet actually thought about in the case of the holonym. When the idea is actualized, it would already be an instance, where the manifestation phase is otherness.

However, it is crucial to note that in the phenomenological stage, there is no information yet. Signs are either possibilities (qualisign) or individual irrational reactions (sinsign), or somewhere in between (index). In the phenomenological stage, we perceive individual sounds, colors, smells, tastes, and textures, which are not yet capable of referring to anything beyond themselves. They are not yet truly signs but quasi-signs (quasisign), as no foundation (phase of establishment=3) has formed through which signs can embody the form of their object and convey it to the interpretation (Romanini, 2006, 54).

In the phenomenological stage, our experience focuses on the sign itself (M). What does it look, sound, smell, taste, or feel like? Only in the subjective stage, when through parallel experience (see section 9.1.3) the sign is able to embody the forms of its object and form a foundation, can we begin to explore what the sign actually represents. What is the object behind the sign really like? Only in the subjective stage does the sign become informative. Only through its foundation can the sign convey information about the object to the interpretation.

Presentation Habit

It is important to carefully address the distinction between an instance and a regulative sign, as socially interpreted, this distinction concerns the differentiation between the individual and the community, and between the individual mind and the communal mind (see section 9.3.4). The distinction between regulative signs and instances is better known as the distinction between type and token. For example, money is a type, while an individual coin or banknote is a token of that type.

At the outset, it should be emphasized that instances and regulative signs are mutually dependent. Regulative signs require instances because they can only influence reality through their material manifestations (EP2: 291, 1903). On the other hand, instances are dependent on regulative signs because they are interpretable only when recognized as manifestations of a law, rule, or custom. Otherwise, they would be mere sinsigns, which cannot contain information themselves. For example, when you hear your ringtone, you understand it as an instance of the phone’s way (regulative sign) of producing a particular sound when called. The ringtone is an informative sign. Conversely, for someone who does not know what a ringtone is, it would be a sinsign: a single irrational, powerful manifestation that does not contain information or signify anything. To them, it would be just a surprising sound that tells nothing.

For a sociologist, the crucial point is how instances can be seen as individual interpretations, which is why we refer to this stage as the subjective stage. Interpretations in the subjective stage occur in the individual’s mind as the individual recognizes a sign as a manifestation of a regulative sign, or an instance. Conversely, a regulative sign is a rule, law, or custom formed through communication within a community. No single member of the community can unilaterally define new rules unless they are a dictator, but even in that case, the members of the community must adopt and internalize the new rule. Regulative signs (i.e., rules) must be widely shared and understood to have the power to guide actions. If only one member perceives a sign as an instance of a regulative sign, they cannot communicate the rule, custom, or law (i.e., regulative sign) to others by producing a new instance. Regulative signs are thus social, collectively accepted rules and customs through which instances of these rules can be interpreted. This is why regulative signs belong to the intersubjective and symbolic stages rather than the subjective stage.

Imagine four cities communicating with each other using a simple code. The cities have agreed that two long consecutive sounds (– –) mean “Hello.” When City 1 sends this message to City 2, City 2 is able to interpret this individual message as an instance of the shared rule or regulative sign. However, City 3 wants to change the rule so that instead of two long sounds, three short sounds (☞ ☞ ☞) would mean “Hello.” City 3 cannot simply assume that the other cities understand this message, as they do not know what three short consecutive sounds mean, because there is no shared foundation for this sign. In other words, the community does not share a common practice (regulative sign), which is why City 1 does not understand what City 3 wants to say. City 1 cannot interpret the received signal as an instance of the regulative sign because it does not share the same rule with City 3. City 1 might, for example, think it is a single disruptive signal. In this case, the signal would be a sinsign, which contains no information.

The same phenomenon occurs in our society with every public institution. Consider money, for example. Why does money have value? A banknote or coin in itself is relatively worthless. It is merely paper or worthless metal. What makes money valuable is the shared rule and law that deem it valuable. Money has value only because we share the practice of seeing it as valuable. An individual banknote is understood as an instance of this commonly shared practice (regulative sign) of attributing value to money. If someone wanted to establish a new currency, they could do so, and the money would be just as functional as the current one, provided that a sufficient number of people share the common rule about its value. Otherwise, a piece of paper is just a meaningless piece of material that contains no information (sinsign).

Representation Habit

We can now clarify the differences between the intersubjective and symbolic stages with a simple example. We all know that dogs have a common practice of wagging their tails when they are happy. In other words, tail-wagging is a regulative sign. In this case, the tail wagged by an individual dog ‘here and now’ is an instance, which you can interpret as happiness because you interpret it as a manifestation of the regulative sign.

However, tail-wagging is not a symbol because the relationship between the sign and the object (S–O) is not based on convention. It is true that dogs have a practice of wagging their tails, but the relationship between tail-wagging and happiness is not based on convention but on a concrete relationship. The wagging tail (sign) is in a material relationship with the dog wagging it, which refers to its happiness (object). Tail-wagging indicates that the dog wagging its tail is happy. If tail-wagging were a symbolic sign, the dog could use tail-wagging to express the symbol “happy.” For example, the dog could ask “Were you happy yesterday?” and wag its tail at the word “happy.” In this case, the relationship between the sign (tail-wagging) and the object (happiness) would be symbolic. However, this is not the case; tail-wagging always means that the dog wagging its tail is happy. A dog does not wag its tail unless it is genuinely happy. In contrast, a sad person can claim to be happy. Mead provides a similar example:

“Animals of a type lower than man respond to certain characters … such as odor in the case of a dog. But it would be beyond the capacity of a dog to indicate to another dog what the odor was. Another dog could not be sent out by the first dog to pick out this odor.” (Mead, 2015, 92.)

Thus, a dog cannot communicate about objects that are not immediately ‘here and now.’ The odor that the dog wants to communicate about would need to be in an actual connection with the sign the dog is using to communicate. Since the odor is not immediate, referring to it would require a symbol that has the same meaning for both parties in communication (Mead, 2015, 46). Only through symbols can we speak and communicate about objects that are not immediately present. For instance, you cannot ask your dog where it was yesterday because yesterday is no longer immediately present.

Communication Habit

The method in the communication phase is the same as an argument, which might be better approached as a philosophical concept rather than a sign recognized through experience. An argument is a process of thinking that aims to produce a determined belief (EP2: 435, 1908). An argument is the only sign capable of referring to its intended interpretation (EP2: 308, 1904). Perhaps it is sufficient to understand an argument as a general goal toward which various processes are directed (Romanini, 2006, 103).

Gary Shank

Something else

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